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The Islamic Juridical Vacuum and Islamic 
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Abstract
This article argues that Islamic authorities do not try to sustain a jurisdiction over 
Islamic divorce in Denmark. They respond to a juridical demand caused by the absence 
of Islamic legal institutions in Denmark, which I call the Islamic juridical vacuum. 
This vacuum entails that sharia is often defined locally in communities or families 
rather than by Islamic authorities, and when women are unable to obtain an Islamic 
divorce they turn to Islamic authorities for help. That is, in the absence of Islamic legal 
institutions they expect Islamic authorities such as imams and teachers in mosques to 
take the role of an Islamic judge upon themselves and issue Islamic divorces. However, 
Islamic authorities in Denmark have no formal legal power to issue divorces and they 
are often incapable of helping women whose husbands object to divorce. Therefore, 
some women end up in a type of marital captivity that Anika Liversage and I – with the 
Arabic word for marrigage, nikah – call nikah-captivity (Liversage and Petersen 2020).
It is often assumed in Danish public debates that imams uphold a sort of parallel legal 
jurisdiction centred around sharia courts (see for example Birk 2020, Borg 2016, Hedin 
2017 or the documentary Moskeerne bag Sløret). The term sharia court (shariadomstol) 
implies that Islamic authorities uphold a jurisdiction, keep a registry of people’s marital 
status, and that they can enforce their decisions. However, no such parallel legal system 
has been found by researchers anywhere in Europe. Instead researchers have found 
a variety of practices that in their most institutionalized form exist as sharia councils 
(Bano 2013; Bowen 2016). However, Islamic juridical practice is in most places 
characterised by the absence of institutions and there is no indication of monopolization 
of Islamic authority (Eijk 2019; Jaraba 2019; Liversage and Jensen 2011; Mustasaari 
2018; Roald 2009). Even British sharia councils’ performance is sometimes unstable 
and the losing party may threaten the scholars in the councils (Bowen 2016: 63, 88-
102).
1 Jesper is PhD in history of religions specialized in Islamic studies.
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In this article, I will argue that Muslim immigration from countries with religious 
family law to Denmark has created an Islamic juridical vacuum, which has generated 
a demand for legal institutions that can assist women who want to divorce Islamically 
without their husbands’ consent. No institution has so far filled the vacuum in 
Denmark and for this reason Islamic authorities such as imams and teachers in mosques 
are often called upon to take this role upon them. However, most Islamic authorities 
are reluctant to get involved and even if they do, they can’t enforce their decisions. This 
means that there is no entity that lay down the rules of Islamic divorce, and thus the 
Islamic juridical vacuum produces a variety of practices that are often defined in the 
social networks in which they are practiced. 
The article is based on 21 semi-structured interviews with Islamic authorities of whom 
19 are male and 2 are women. Male informants are referred to as M followed by a 
number from 1-19 and female informants are referred to as F followed by 1 or 2. I 
made the interviews in 2018-19 as part of a research project led by Anika Liversage on 
Islamic divorce practice in Denmark at VIVE (The Danish Center for Social Science 
Research).
The informants’ jurisprudential orientation is spread over Hanafi, Shafi’i, Maliki, Jafari, 
and a few informants are not following a school of interpretation (madhab). 2 Many Shia 
Muslims follow Jafari, but due to this school’s historical development in close proximity 
with the Shafi’i school, which is a Sunni-school, the discussions regarding divorce 
are very similar between these branches of Sunni and Shia (Stewart 1998). Although 
the present study found that school of interpretation has a limited influence on how 
Muslims divorce, the Marja-institution had an influence on a few cases because their 
authority is not territorially confined (Liversage and Petersen 2020: 222-230).
An Islamic authority is defined as a person who in a community can speak with 
authority on Islam; some are imams, others are teachers while others again are in other 
ways recognized for their knowledge on Islam. The data from the interviews with 
imams and religious authorities have been triangulated with interviews with 37 women 
who have difficulty or who can’t obtain an Islamic divorce (details on the sample, 
triangulation and further results of the project can be found in Liversage and Petersen 
2020 and in Petersen and Vinding 2020).
2 See details on the sample in Liversagen and Petersen (2020) page 46-47.
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The article starts with a brief introduction to nikah (Islamic marriage) followed by a 
short genealogy of Islamic divorce practice from sharia to Islamic law in the late 19th 
century. Today Muslims navigate three juridical spaces related to divorce: pre-modern 
sharia, Islamic law, and secular law. This genealogy is followed by an explanation of the 
current situation in Denmark where a segment of Muslim women is unable to obtain 
Islamic divorces. The last part of the article focus on overlaps between Danish law and 
sharia, and the effect sharia practice can have on the outcome of divorces cases under 
Danish law.
It should be stressed that there is a vast diversity in Islamic divorce practices in Denmark 
and that the informants for this article have been purposely selected because of their 
relation to the juridical vacuum (Bernard 2011: 147-155). That is, this article does not 
reflect normative Muslim practice in Denmark, it describes a segment of women who 
are unable to divorce Islamically.
Nikah – Islamic marriage
It is common for both Islamic authorities and a segment of religious Muslims in 
Denmark to make a distinction between nikah (Islamic marriage) and civil marriage. 
Imam M1 explains that this is a distinction between the Islamic and the secular:
… nikah is not a human invention. It is a divine decree that came with 
the creation of Adam and Eve while the civil marriage was invented a 
century ago or something like that. So, it is obvious that the nikah which 
came by divine decree thousands and thousands of years ago is more 
important [than civil marriage]. (interview 27 April 2019). 3
As imam M1 understands it, there is no overlap between Islamic and civil marriage. 
They constitute two separate marriages that regulate personal status: the nikah regulate 
personal status under sharia and civil marriage regulate personal status under Danish 
law. This conception of religious marriage is not unique to Muslims, it is also upheld 
by members of other religious minorities in Denmark such as a segment of the Jewish, 
Catholic, and Hindu communities (Liversage and Jensen 2011: 10; Liversage and 
Petersen 2020: 14 and 101-102).
3 Translated from Danish
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There is no church in Islam and nikah (Islamic marriage) is therefore not a sacrament. 
That is, imams are not ordained by a religious institution to perform nikah. Within fiqh 
(Islamic jurisprudence) a nikah is merely a civil contract between two people: a groom 
puts an offer forth and the bride or her guardian (wali) accepts the offer (or vice versa) 
in front of two witnesses (Hallaq 2009: 271-280 and Vikør 2012: 300-309). The nikah 
renders a sexual relation between the bride and the groom free of sin, and in addition 
to this, nikah is seen as a highly recommended part of a good Muslim life. Imam M3 
explains that:
Marriage is a contract between two partners. That is, the state is not 
involved, the imam is not involved – the imam merely facilitates the 
conclusion of the marriage contract. He explains that you should say 
this, you say that, you say this, and there you go, you are married in 
front of two witnesses etc. It is not the imam who performs the marriage 
ceremony – he is in principle superfluous in the conclusion of a marriage. 
(interview 14 March 2019). 4
It should be noted that even though there is no basis for it within the Islamic legal 
tradition many Muslims conceptualize the imam as a sort of Islamic priest whose ritual 
performance is needed to render a nikah valid. Similarly, the Danish law on religious 
communities outside the state-church § 15 (Lov om trossamfund uden for folkekirken) is 
based on a Christian conception of religion according to which marriage is a sacrament 
administered by a priesthood on behalf of a religious institution such as a church. 
That is, the Danish state issues marriage licences to imams as if they were ordained by 
a churchlike institution to perform an Islamic marriage ritual even though such a role 
does not exist in the Islamic legal tradition.
Sharia, Islamic law, and secular law
The historical origin of the distinction between nikah and civil marriage is important 
for the understanding of the current situation. In the 19th century Muslim majority 
countries adopted the model of European legal systems and this entailed a transition 
from pre-modern sharia to Islamic law that we still see the aftereffects of today in both 
Muslim majority countries and especially in Europe. The transition from pre-modern 
4 Translated from Danish
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to Islamic law entailed so fundamental changes to the conception of law that the former 
system is largely incomprehensible  to people other than historians and legal scholars, or 
as professor Jakob Skovgaard-Petersen puts it: “today these [modern] legal institutions 
and procedures are so ingrained that people in the Muslim world, like us, can hardly 
imagine what a pre-modern legal system looked like before the modern territorial state” 
(Skovgaard-Petersen 2019). 5
Sharia is conceptually a divinely revealed set of instruction on how to live a good 
Muslim life in accordance with God’s commandments. These instructions cover rituals, 
ethics, instructions for everyday life, and an area that could be called pre-modern law. It 
is important to stress that there is no text or written document that contains the sharia; 
only God knows the sharia and humans are therefore destined to derive the sharia from 
sources such as the Qur’an, the narrations about Muhammed (hadith), and a range 
of other texts. Human attempts at deriving the sharia from the sources is called fiqh 
which means insight. Islamic legal scholars – or people with insights as they are called 
in Arabic (fuqaha) – belong to a range of different schools of interpretation and there 
are even disagreements over the correct interpretation of sharia within these schools (for 
an overview see Bakhtiar 1996). That is, fiqh is a discursive tradition rather than a fixed 
set of laws and this was the basis of pre-modern sharia practice within Islamic courts. 
It is important to notice that there were no common point of reference to a legal text 
for these courts. The individual Islamic judge (qadi) practiced his profession based on 
his insight into the discursive legal tradition that he was educated within (Hallaq 2009; 
Vikør 2012; Zubaida 2003).
The practice of marriage under pre-modern sharia was largely a private matter and often 
the nikah contracts were merely oral. Likewise, divorce was a private matter. A man 
who wanted to divorce could pronounce the talaq-divorce, which effectively terminated 
the marriage. If a woman wanted to divorce, this could be negotiated and the husband 
would receive a compensation for agreeing to a khula-divorce, which also terminated 
the marriage. Again, this was a private matter and no legal institutions were involved 
(for details see Hallaq 2009: 280-287 Vikør 2012: 309-316).
However, if disputes couldn’t be handled in the private sphere, between families, or 
private arbitrators one could seek the assistance of the Islamic court. This was for 
5 Translated from Danish.
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example necessary if a husband had travelled abroad without returning and therefore 
effectively rendered his wife without maintenance and unable to marry another 
breadwinner. In the absence of her husband a woman – possibly a widowed woman – 
could not obtain her husband’s consent to divorce and she therefore needed an Islamic 
judge who could issue the divorce. However, some schools of interpretation (madhab) 
like the Hanafi school would not allow such a legal action because this was seen as a 
violation of the husband’s right to withhold consent. However, as professor Knut Vikør 
explains, Islamic judges would often be practical about this, and when Islamic judges 
from for example the Hanafi and Shafi’i school sat on the same court, the Hanafi judge 
would delegate this type of divorces to the Shafi’i judge:
The Hanafi court has often accepted that this is a real weakness in their 
law, which has led to unacceptable hardship for women who through no 
fault of their own have lost their only realistic provider. When Hanafi 
and Shafi’i judges have worked in the same court, this has on occasion 
made them come to a tacit understanding: If such a case came before 
a Hanafi judge he would often excuse himself and let such cases go 
before his Shafi’i colleagues. The latter could then dissolve the marriage 
according to his school and the Hanafi judge would later accept this 
decision on the bases of reciprocal acceptance of verdicts made by the 
other schools. (Vikør 2012: 313-4).
This case demonstrates two important points: in the pre-modern courtroom sharia was 
applied as a discursive tradition with an eye on the practical effects of it and Islamic 
judges would accept each other’s verdicts even though they themselves did not agree 
with the interpretation of sharia that formed the bases of it. Similar observations have 
been made by other scholars both historically and in contemporary practice (Bowen 
2013: 138-155).
With the advent of European legal systems in large parts of the Muslim world in the 
19th and 20th century, Islamic law was introduced as a replacement of pre-modern 
sharia. Legislators picked the most suitable interpretations of sharia and drafted 
Islamic legal codes that were implemented within a European inspired legal system. 
This drastically changed the practice of marriage and divorce because couples were 
now required to register their marriages and apply for divorce under Islamic law. That 
is, marriage and divorce were no longer a private matter, it was regulated under the 
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jurisdiction of an Islamic court system that could enforce its verdicts (See Otto 2010 for 
examples).
Some Muslim countries went even further and secularized the personal status law. On 4 
October 1926 Turkey for example introduced a new family law based on the Swiss civil 
code, which replaced the former Islamic law, Mecelle. The new law constituted a clear 
break with the past by abolishing polygamy and making the sexes substantially equal 
in rights to divorce, but most importantly it transferred marriage and divorce from the 
domain of the Islamic clergy to a secular legal system. Marriages had to be registered 
with the state and divorce became subject to court rulings under secular personal status 
laws (Kocak 2010, 243). Because the transition from Mecelle to secular law in Turkey 
took place almost a century ago it has become part of the Turkish way of doing things, 
and Turks therefore tend to accept European divorces issued under European legal codes 
as Islamically valid (Liversage and Petersen 2020: 196; Roald 2009: 110).
However, a segment of Danish Muslims from countries that practice Islamic law such 
as Afghanistan, Pakistan, and most Arab countries do not accept the Islamic validity 
of divorce under secular law. It should be noticed that some immigrants from these 
countries do accept secular divorce as Islamically valid but so far, no research project has 
determined how many belong to either segment in Denmark. The absence of an Islamic 
legal institution has caused an Islamic juridical vacuum from which highly diverse 
Islamic legal practices emerge. Islamic authorities who get involved in Islamic divorces 
do not oppose Danish law, they accept that a divorce ruling by a Danish court changes 
a person’s status under Danish law, but this is seen as unrelated to divorce according to 
sharia (Liversage and Petersen 2020: 196-200).
Immigrants continue their way of doing things after migration but school of thought 
typically plays a minor role. The majority of Turks and Pakistanis in Denmark for 
example belong to the Hanafi madhab but Turks typically use the Danish secular legal 
institutions to divorce, whereas segments of Pakistanis maintain the notion that an 
Islamic divorce is needed in addition to the secular divorce. This is because Pakistan 
use Islamic law whereas Turkey – as mentioned above – use secular law, and these ways 
of doing things are continued in the diaspora and in some cases inherited in modified 
versions by their children (see Liversage and Petersen 2020 for details).
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The Islamic juridical vacuum in Denmark
Some Muslim countries have revised their Islamic legal codes so that women have 
access to divorce without their husband’s consent, but even in countries where these 
revisions haven’t been made, women have developed somewhat effective strategies for 
obtaining divorces without their husbands consent even though the legal system bestow 
unequal rights on the sexes (see for example Mir Hosseini 2000). However, in a Danish 
context these legal institutions do not exist, and this absence means that a segment of 
Muslims falls back on locally adapted understandings of pre-modern sharia as a way of 
regulating divorce as a private matter. Women therefore rely on their husbands consent 
if they want an Islamic divorce that is accepted socially but in cases of disputes there 
are no legal institutions that can hear their cases. For this reason, some women start 
searching for court-like institutions that can play the role of an Islamic court or Islamic 
authorities who can play the role of an Islamic judge. In other words, it is not the 
imam or Islamic religious authority who tries to uphold a jurisdiction, he is cast in the 
role of a sort of quasi Islamic judge by a demand among a segment of Muslim women 
(Liversage and Petersen 2020: 177-180). However, the interviewed Islamic authorities 
are well aware that they do not hold the institutional power to dissolve a marriage and 
for this reason most of them reject this casting and take the role as mediators instead. 
Islamic authorities are, furthermore, well aware of other issues of involving themselves 
in divorces such as security concerns, time constrains, and some do not see what Islamic 
divorce has to do with the imam-role.
Interestingly the juridical vacuum empowers the husband in a marital dispute in that 
his right to withhold divorce is not disputed by any legal institution. As it is now, a 
woman who wants an Islamic divorce without her husband’s consent, finds herself in 
a legal vacuum with three paths that are unlikely to provide her with a stable Islamic 
divorce: 1) pre-modern sharia under which she may need her husband’s consent to 
divorce. 2) provided that the marriage is registered under Islamic law abroad, she may 
be able – depending on the country in question – to obtain a divorce there. However, 
this will take time, be costly, and may require support from her family. 3) provided that 
she is also married to her husband under Danish law, she can obtain a divorce from 
the administrative unit that handles divorces, Familieretshuset. However, this divorce is 
unlikely to be accepted as Islamically valid in a community that does not understand 
secular law to have an effect on nikah.
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Path two and three are not available to all women because they rely on prior registration 
of the marriage, and path one and three take place within the Islamic juridical vacuum 
and can therefore lead to unstable Islamic divorces. In practice, the rules for Islamic 
divorce are laid down locally in communities and sometimes just between families, 
and a woman’s ability to obtain a divorce either by declaring it herself or declaring 
a secular divorce under Danish law valid depends on the resources she has available. 
In other words, as the field is structured as an Islamic juridical vacuum it is the local 
power dynamics that determine the rules by which Muslims divorce and often Islamic 
authorities will not become involved. Women with many resources such as family 
support, a strong network, education, job, proficiency in Danish or English, knowledge 
about their rights and how the Danish system works etc. are much more able to define 
the rules that regulate divorce and they merely declare themselves Islamically divorced. 
That is, they make a decision but its effect depends on whether they have the resources 
to “enforce” it. On the other hand, women who lack resources can become trapped 
in what is called nikah-captivity (a neologism coined in Liversage and Petersen 2020). 
However, as mentioned above, type 1 and 3 divorces are bound to be disputed and the 
outcome of them largely depends on how it is received by the woman’s significant others 
and her community. Descendants’ higher level of resources compared to immigrants’ 
level of resources is the most important variable for explaining why descendants and 
converts in general are more able to Islamically divorce their husbands (Liversage and 
Petersen 2020: 17-18).
Type 1 and 3 divorces can be unstable in the sense that women may come in doubt 
as to whether they are valid, and this doubt may arise much later in life when they 
for example want to remarry. In rare cases this also holds true if the woman files 
her divorce petition in a British sharia council even though these decisions seems 
to meet widespread acceptance because of the British sharia councils’ high degree 
of institutionalization. However, it should be noted that even though British sharia 
councils have achieved the highest degree of institutionalization in Europe, their 
performance is also unstable in some cases (Bowen 2016: 88ff.).
The role of religious authorities
The juridical vacuum puts pressure on imams and Islamic religious authorities to act 
even though they in many cases do not have the institutional power to issue divorces 
as speech acts (Austin 1975). The American anthropologist, John R. Bowen, suggests 
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that we in the context of sharia councils instead understand speech acts from the 
perspective of the French philosopher Jacques Derrida, who in his book Limited Inc 
argues that speech acts primarily are effective because of a pre-linguistic consensus 
that exists prior to them being pronounced (Bowen 2016: 88; Derrida 1977). That 
is, a religious authority can issue a divorce, but it will only be seen as valid if both the 
wife and the husband have the intention of divorcing. Otherwise it will be disputed 
and declared invalid by the disagreeing part. This means that the more a woman need 
the Islamic authority’s assistance to obtain a divorce, the less he is able to do for her 
because his decision depends on the husband’s acceptance of his claim to institutional 
power. Furthermore, it is often the women who do not have sufficient resource to 
Islamically divorce themselves who turn to the Islamic authorities, and as the effect of 
the authorities decision in many cases depends on the woman’s resources they do are 
unlikely to have much effect. This inverse correlation is amplified by other variables 
such as security: if the woman is married to a violent husband, Islamic authorities will 
be more reluctant to get involved because of concern for their own and their family’s 
safety. Stories about violent husbands are widespread among Danish Islamic authorities 
with the most extreme case being a husband who showed up in the mosque and put a 
gun to the head of an imam who had issued a divorce to his wife. It should be noted 
that even in Britain security is an issue. A scholar in Bradford for example had his house 
torched by a disgruntled husband after he had issued a divorce (Bowen 2016: 63).
Therefore, imams and religious authorities who choose to interfere on behalf of a 
woman in a divorce case first and foremost try to convince the husband to pronounce 
the divorce because this is the only viable way to create stable Islamic divorces without 
a legal institution. In other words, it is the husband who performs the speech act that 
terminates the marriage – not the imam (for a more detailed analysis of the related fiqh 
and its application in a Danish context see Petersen and Vinding 2020).
Divorce constitutes a problem for Islamic authorities because they are expected to make 
juridical evaluations without formal training in the relevant fiqh, and because their 
engagement in bad divorce cases as mere civilians without institutional power seldom 
have the intended effect. This is especially the case with type 2 divorces as a private 
person’s decision in Denmark have no effect on a woman’s personal status under the 
law of a foreign country. However, some women merely want an Islamic authority’s 
assurance that she is divorced in the eyes of God, and some religious authorities feel 
obligated to do something for these women who find themselves in the Islamic juridical 
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vacuum as Imam M1 explains: ”It is because somebody has to do it. You know, we can’t 
just let people who have that kind of problems be stuck in limbo or leave them on their 
own. That is not okay.” (interview 27 April 2019). 6 However, Imam M1 also explained 
that one has to be weary of helping too much because then it is rumoured that one can 
help and that attracts many more cases and all the problems that comes with them. Not 
all interviewees were as sympathetic as M1, but all agreed that the vacuum is a problem 
not just for the women, but also for the imams, religious authorities, and ultimately the 
Danish state.
When the interviewed Islamic authorities get involved in cases, they employ a number 
of strategies if men are reluctant to divorce. That is, they have ways of strategically 
trying to fill the vacuum by posing as a valid Islamic institution or in other ways 
produce divorces that are mistaken for “real” divorces. Others form ad-hoc divorce 
councils where a number of imams come together and issue a divorce which is typically 
written on a stamped paper with a letterhead. This spreads the security risk over several 
individuals and the divorce may hold a higher level of validity in the community when 
several prominent imams have signed it. 
Some Islamic authorities comfort women by explaining that they are in fact Islamically 
divorced by referring to fatwas or arguments that either state that women have the 
right to unilateral divorce (Jaraba 2019: 85-6) or that a civil divorce constitutes an 
Islamic divorce (European Council for Fatwa and Research 2017). It should be noted, 
though, that these fatwas are disputed even though they come from such authorities 
as the sheikh of al-Azhar, which is one of the world’s leading universities within 
Islamic studies, and the European Council of Fatwa and Research, which has several 
distinguished Islamic legal scholars on their board. One Danish imam has even written 
a 200+ pages argument for the Islamic validity of civil divorce in a Scandinavian context 
(Chendid 2015). However, a woman’s ability to apply such a fatwa to her own case 
depends on her resources. In other words, even though an Islamic authority may apply 
such a fatwa in a conversation with a woman it does not necessarily have any effect on 
her social status as Islamically married or ability to divorce Islamically (see Jaraba 2019 
for a typical case or Liversage and Petersen 2020: 73-74 and 196-199).
6 Translated from Danish.
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These and similar fatwas’ inefficiency underline that Islamic divorce is a matter of social 
dynamics in the web of relations around the Muslim woman who wants to divorce, 
and that Islamic authorities often have limited power in this web. In bad divorce cases 
the symbolic value of concepts related to Islamic marriage and divorce often merely 
constitute semantic resources, which are utilized – or weaponized 7 – in the coercive 
control of a woman, and men who exercise this coercive control will not let themselves 
be disarmed by an imam or other religious authority when they can choose to ignore 
them instead.
Attempts at resolving the issue of the juridical vacuum
There have been several attempts – especially in the last decade – to found a more 
permanent Islamic institution that can fill the juridical vacuum, but this has proven 
difficult due to the high demographic diversity among Danish Muslims. There is no 
common Islamic marriage and divorce practice among Danish Muslims, and it is 
therefore difficult to come to an agreement on a central Islamic authority that serves all 
Muslims such as the Jewish Beth Din or the Catholic Ecclesiastical council (Liversage 
and Jensen 2011: 26 and 44). The interviews with Islamic authorities demonstrate 
that a few divorce councils have existed for short periods of time, but they tend to 
disintegrate either due to internal disputes or the pressure from disgruntled husbands 
and families. It should also be noted that even if a divorce council has made a decision 
in a case this may not deter a man who is stalking his (ex)wife or engage in other kinds 
of post-separation violence. In other words, even though a decision by a divorce council 
holds a higher degree of validity its effect still depends on the woman’s resources or 
ability to implement it. Some Islamic authorities refer women to British sharia councils 
or similar institutions abroad and a few help women write a good petition for divorce to 
these institutions.
The interviews and collection of juridical documents for the study, furthermore, 
demonstrates that some imams have started using nikah marriage contracts within 
which the bride has the right to divorce her husband. Likewise, some imams have 
started to write a clause into the contracts that delegates the power of declaring the 
marriage dissolved to the imam himself. These solutions constitute practical ways of 
7 This term is coined by professor in Islamic studies, Jørgen S. Nielsen, but as he has not used 
it in writing yet I am unable to make a reference.
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limiting the power of the husband in the juridical vacuum or making him share it with 
his wife. Even though these types of contracts are becoming increasingly popular, they 
are not widespread, and some couples even object to them.
Islamic divorce and Danish secular divorce
As explained above, none of the interviewed Islamic authorities see Islamic divorce 
practice as an infringement on Danish law because nikah and civil marriage are seen as 
two separate marriages. Some informants – as mentioned above – even argue Islamically 
for the Islamic validity of divorce under Danish law. However, conflicts can arise when 
it comes to child custody. All 21 interviewed Islamic authorities held the position that 
Muslims should follow Danish law. Imam M8 for example explains that:
There are many [men] who says to me: “but in Islam we have the right 
to keep the children living with me – you know the ones who are older.” 
I say: “akhi [my brother], we live in Denmark, we do not live in Saudi 
Arabia or Lebanon or Jordan. We live in Denmark; here it is Danish 
law that is the law.” We are of course Muslims and we follow the word 
of Allah as well as we can, but legally we are under Danish law. We can’t 
establish our own legal system in Denmark… (Interview 27 February 
2019) 8
The husband that imam M9 refers to makes a clear reference to pre-modern sharia and 
some versions of Islamic law under which children of a divorced couple belong to the 
mother until they reach puberty when custody is transferred to the husband (Hallaq 
2009: 287-289). Although all 21 Islamic authorities acknowledge Danish law many also 
noted that men occasionally weaponize the talaq when they negotiate civil divorce. That 
is, they threaten to withhold the Islamic divorce if their wife does not agree to his terms 
in the settlement. These terms can be financial as K2 – one of the two female Islamic 
authorities – explains: 
The worst is that so many women jump on that wagon where they say: 
“But I just want to get rid of him, so I will give him what he wants”. 
And also: “But I do not want anything from him – if we can just get 
8 Translated from Danish.
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divorced”. That is where I try to stop the woman and say: “Now, sit 
down and think. I know you want to get out of this marriage, and that 
you psychologically feel bad, but you should not leave this marriage 
without your haqq [justice]. You should not let him take it all.” But 
unfortunately, that is often how it ends. The woman says: “I do not 
care, if I can just get out of it, he can have what he wants”. And this is a 
distortion of women’s rights… (Liversage & Petersen, 2020, p. 228)
As several other Islamic authorities K2 explains that men sometimes use sharia as it is 
defined in their own community to bargain a good divorce under Danish secular law. 
That is, they promise a stable divorce, which means that they will agree to an Islamic 
divorce with witnesses provided that the woman agree to a good settlement under 
secular law. It should be stressed that this study employs a qualitative method and 
therefore it cannot say anything about the extend of this practice.
Some men also use child custody as a bargaining tool in secular divorce cases. That 
is, the man can demand that his wife renounces custody of their shared children or 
another major sacrifice in return for his consent to Islamic divorce (cf. Jaraba 2019: 
83-86). Because of this overlap between secular law and sharia – as it is defined locally 
within the Islamic juridical vacuum – some Muslims expect Islamic authorities to get 
involved as well because their arbitration or mediation in Islamic divorce cases can 
extend into an area that is regulated by Danish law. Some Islamic authorities engage in 
these discussions, but most stay out of them (see Liversage and Petersen 2020: 194-6 for 
details).
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